Philosophy; philosophical theology; philosophical anthropology; history.

Arab countries; intellectual life; congresses.

Arabic lanaguage; history and criticism.

The democratic principle in its extreme form is the assertation that the mere fact of free birth is alone sufficient to constitute a claim to all offices. It is never the claim of a majority to rule, but it is the demand that every one, whether rich or poor, high- or low-born, shall be equally represented in the constitution. This is what Aristotle calls the principle of numerical equality.-from "Chapter VI: Democracy"One of the most renowned classical scholars of the turn (...) of the 20th century here offers a lucid and highly readable overview of a difficult and little understood aspect of Greek history: its public law, not just how it was structured but how it behaved in action. This 1896 book-perfect for university students, amateur historians, and readers of the history of the law-covers the full range of Greek legal development, from the origin of the city-state and the beginnings of the Greek monarchy to the social and political institutions of the far-flung Greek civilization to the rise of federalism and its long-term historical impact on the cultures that came after.British classical scholar A.H.J. GREENIDGE was a lecturer in ancient history at Brasenose College, Oxford. He is also the author of Roman Public and Private Law (1894), Legal Procedure in Cicero's Time (1901), and Roman Public Life (1901), among many other works of ancient history. (shrink)

Knyha 1. Teoretyko-metodolohichni osnovy -- Knyha 2. Sot︠s︡iokulʹturni pidstavy i︠e︡vropeĭsʹkoho konstytut︠s︡ionalizmu.

On Sikh ethics; includes brief biographies of Sikh religious leaders.

For the first time in print, well-known spiritual teacher A.H. Almaas presents the highest level and most profound teachings of the Diamond Approach on the true nature of reality and the path to enlightenment. For more than thirty years, A.H. Almaas has been developing and teaching the Diamond Approach, a spiritual path of self-realization and maturity based on an original synthesis of modern discoveries in the field of psychology and a new paradigm about spiritual nature. If we can say the (...) Diamond Approach has a goal it is to realize the truth at progressively deeper levels until one reaches the ultimate Truth, the Absolute, and to become integrated into that truth so that we are a living presence and embodiment of that truth. The teachings of this path have been unfolding over time, and Runaway Realization presents--for the first time in print--the highest level of teachings in the Diamond Approach in the most profound work by Almaas so far. In this book, Almaas offers a detailed look at the true nature of reality and the nature of enlightenment. He also talks about practice--what it is and what it isn't, and how practice relates to the process of realization. He looks at what it is to be a human being and what our role is in the totality of the universe. The material includes a discussion of the nature of space and time, as well as a view of more and more subtle levels of realization. (shrink)

Speeches of the author on theory of knowledge in the context of Islamic philosophy.

A promise to do some action seems to create a binding obligation to do that action. And yet, paradoxically, an obligation seems not to be a fact that we can create or bring into existence; we can create an obligation only by creating or bringing into existence something else. The only way to avoid the paradox is to show that the act of promising creates something other than an obligation, which nonetheless binds us to perform the action in question. After (...) considering and rejecting various options such as the promisee's expectation and the promisor's resolve, Prichard locates the bindingness of a promise in a prior general promise, which allows the noises we make when promising to generate an obligation to perform the promised action. (shrink)

In his general account of moral thought, Prichard holds that to regard a given action as right, we must imagine ourselves to be in a certain set of circumstances. In doing so, we conceive of ourselves as bound by those circumstances to perform that action. Since we have various general convictions about moral obligation, no single characteristic leads us to regard right acts as right. When two general convictions conflict, we are not in a position to know what our duty (...) is. Being ignorant of some relevant circumstances, we cannot answer the question ‘What ought we to do?’ This follows from the fact that no common characteristic renders actions into duties. (shrink)

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English. ECMO是一項高風險、高創傷、高消耗的創新技術，它能夠為新冠病毒肺炎重症患者提供挽救性治療°ECMO的治療目標是幫助患者恢復心肺功能，或者橋接最終治療，包括器械植入，或者器官移植等。然而，容易被忽視的 事實是，ECMO挽救了一些患者的生命，但也可能讓那些沒有康復機會的患者陷入醫療困境。於是，ECMO的臨床應用不得不面對一些反對意見，包括嚴重併發症危害患者生命安全、無效治療導致技術失敗，以及大量佔用資 源損害醫療公平等。ECMO技術的臨床應用應該在尊重生命價值和患者意願的基礎上，合理設置治療目標、確立可接受退出標準、妥善處理患者意願與ECMO設備撤除困境之間的倫理衝突，建立適度倫理框架以合理控制醫療 干預的邊界。 Characterized by high risk, high trauma and high consumption, Extra-Corporeal Membrane Oxygenation (ECMO) is an innovative technology that can be used as salvage therapy for COVID-19 patients. ECMO treatment can help restore patients' cardiopulmonary function or can bridge their final treatment, including device implantation or organ transplantation. However, although ECMO saves some patients' lives, it can also leave those with no chance of recovery in a medical dilemma. ECMO (...) is thus controversial: it is criticized for technical failures and ineffective treatments, and its use raises questions about medical equity. This paper argues that the clinical application of ECMO technology should be based on a respect for the value of life and the will of patients, reasonably set therapeutic goals, acceptable withdrawal criteria, proper management of the conflict between patients' desires and the medical dilemma, and the establishment of an ethical framework to control the limits of medical intervention. (shrink)

Examines four principle questions about moral obligation raised by key philosophers: Plato asks in The Republic ‘Will a man be better off for doing his duty?’; Plato then asks ‘Ought man to do his duty?’; we may also ask ‘What is the criterion of a duty?’; and we may ask ‘What is moral obligation?’ Rejecting the last question as unreal, Prichard then argues against the connection between duty and happiness or duty and personal or general advantage. After critiquing both teleological (...) and quasi‐teleological theories of obligation, he ends by contrasting goodness and obligation. (shrink)

Maintaining that the existence of Moral Philosophy, as it is usually understood, rests on a mistake, Prichard undertakes to formulate our true attitude towards moral obligations. The right action does not depend upon either our own good or what is good. Obligations are underivative, immediate, and self‐evident, and therefore, we do not come to appreciate them through argument or a process of non‐moral thinking. The mistake on which Moral Philosophy rests, which links obligation to virtue or desire, parallels the mistake (...) underpinning the Theory of Knowledge. Like moral obligation, knowledge is immediate; it need not be vindicated or improved by additional knowledge. (shrink)

Discusses central aspects of Kant's work on the nature of morality and the basis of moral obligation. In examining the categorical imperative and the hypothetical imperative, emphasizes the real nature of the distinction between these principles: whereas the former is binding upon every one, the latter is binding only upon some individuals, namely those individuals who want the end for which a prescribed action is a means. Also considers the nature of the will, Kant's criterion of the rightness of a (...) right action, and two criticisms of Kant's view of morality that arise from his attempt to offer a general answer to the question ‘Why ought an action be performed?’ Then turns to Kant's proof of freedom, which it is claimed just barely misses making the right point that action is only possible under the idea of freedom. Concludes by examining Kant's proof of immortality and the existence of God. (shrink)

Prichard's topic here is the nature of ‘ought’. If we were to take ‘I ought to will x’ to be equivalent to ‘my willing x ought to exist’, then it is true that ‘If I were to will a certain change x, my willing x would be something that ought to exist.’ For this to hold, either my willing x would itself be something good or my willing x would cause something good. Prichard, however, rejects this view on the grounds (...) that one cannot know, in willing x to exist, whether one's willing x is something that ought to exist. One can only know that if one were to will x, one would be willing something that one thought ought to exist. (shrink)